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Innovative activities have public good characteristics in the sense that the cost of producing the innovation is
high compared to the cost of producing subsequent units. Moreover, knowledge of how to produce subsequent
units is widely known once the innovation has occurred and is, therefore, non-rivalrous. The main question
of this paper is whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate
incentives for innovation. The ability of the mechanism designer to exploit such information depends crucially
on the ability of the innovator to manipulate market signals. We show that if the innovator cannot manipulate
market signals, then the eﬃcient levels of innovation can be implemented without deadweight losses–for
example, by using appropriately designed prizes. If the innovator can use bribes, buybacks, or other ways of
manipulating market signals, patents are necessary.
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Prosperity and economic growth depend fundamentally on innovation, that is, on the pro-
duction of new ideas, goods, techniques, and processes. A widely shared belief is that competitive
markets, on their own, will produce an inadequate supply of innovation. One argument that sup-
ports this belief is that many types of innovation have public good characteristics. The cost of
producing an idea or the ﬁrst unit of a good is large. The cost of replicating an idea or producing
copies of an innovation is small, especially compared to the cost of innovating. In the absence of
intellectual property rights, competitive markets will produce duplicates and sell them at essentially
marginal cost. The producer of the ﬁrst unit of the good will then be unable to recoup the costs of
innovation and will rationally choose not to innovate.
An extensive literature on innovation has discussed the eﬃciency of various mechanisms
intended to increase the level of innovation above that produced by the competitive markets.1 The
central question in the theory of intellectual property rights is to determine the best mechanism that
weighs the social beneﬁts of innovation against the costs of distortions imposed by the mechanism.
One frequently used mechanism is the patent system, which grants property rights to innovators
for some period of time and prevents competitors from copying the innovation. Granting monopoly
rights of this form induces innovation by allowing inventors to recoup the costs of an innovation.
However, patents impose the usual deadweight costs of monopoly on the society. The classic analysis
of patents (see, e.g., Nordhaus 1969) weighs the costs of monopoly distortions against the beneﬁts
of encouraging innovation.
An alternative mechanism is to award prizes.2 Prizes reward innovators while making the
fruits of the innovation public. Competitive markets then produce an eﬃcient number of units of
the good or exploit the idea associated with the innovation as eﬃciently as possibly. This mechanism
has the advantage that it avoids the monopoly distortions associated with patents. The disadvantage
of this mechanism is that it requires the entity awarding prizes to have a great deal of information
about the social value of the innovation. This social value is often not directly available to the prize
giver. Thus, an important question is, how can the prize giver use information from competitors in
the industry or, more generally, from the market to elicit the social value of the innovation?
This question is particularly interesting in the context of the theory of innovation because
1See Scotchmer (2004) for a comprehensive treatment.
2The classic analysis by Wright (1983) discusses patents and research prizes. See also Hopenhayn, Llobet, and
Mitchell (2006) for a modern mechanism design treatment of prizes, patents, and buyouts.those who argue that innovation has public good characteristics explicitly assume that copies of
innovated goods can be produced at little more than production costs. In other words, once the
good is invented, competitors in the marketplace have a great deal of information on how to produce
the good in question. The social value of the good depends crucially on the number of units of the
good that will be sold in the competitive marketplace. Any theory of patents as a form of intellectual
property must ask why mechanisms cannot be devised which exploit information that will become
available in the marketplace after the good has been innovated.
In this paper, we ask whether market signals can be used to reward innovation appropriately
while avoiding the deadweight costs of monopoly. We answer this question by setting up a general
mechanism design framework. In this framework, a planner can use information from innovators,
competitors, and the marketplace to reward the innovator. We ﬁrst consider an environment in
which the innovator cannot manipulate the information about the value of the innovation. We show
that a prize-like mechanism can induce socially eﬃcient levels of innovation and completely avoid
the deadweight losses of monopoly. We then show how to construct a mechanism that yields a
socially eﬃcient outcome as a unique equilibrium. In terms of implementation, such mechanisms
may take a variety of forms. For example, we show that a mechanism that makes the prize for the
innovation a function of total sales in competitive markets can implement socially eﬃcient levels of
innovation.
We then analyze several classes of environments where the innovator can manipulate market
signals. Two forms of market manipulation are of particular interest: bribes and buybacks. In
terms of bribes, we assume that the innovator can make binding commitments to make payments to
market participants. For example, if the mechanism involves the use of prizes which are functions
o fa g g r e g a t es a l e s ,w ea l l o wi n n o v a t o r st ob r i b eo t h e rp r o d u c e r st oi n d u c et h e mt om i s r e p r e s e n t
sales. We show that bribes of this kind can be used by the innovator to subvert market signals
completely. Indeed, we show that the best mechanism necessarily resembles patents. Society must
then necessarily incur the deadweight costs of monopoly to induce innovations. One qualiﬁcation
to this result is that the associate bribes may need to be large. Indeed, if bribes are restricted to
be bounded, but prizes can be larger than the maximal bribes, socially eﬃcient levels of innovation
can be implemented by prize-like mechanisms.
We examine the possibility that implicit collusion through repeated interaction is a bribe-like
mechanism. We show that implicit collusion may indeed substitute for bribes but that the size of
the implied bribes is necessarily bounded. If prizes can be larger than this bound, implicit collusion
2through repeated interaction is not, by itself, a barrier to the use of prizes to ensure eﬃciency.
In terms of other forms of market manipulation, we show that prize-like mechanisms are
vulnerable to hidden buybacks. That is, prizes can be manipulated by the innovator secretly pur-
chasing the good so as to make it seem that the market size is larger than it is. We show that, if
the costs of these buybacks are small relative to the costs of the innovation, any mechanism that
induces innovation must necessarily induce patents.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the desirability of the patents as a
mechanism to induce innovation relies crucially on the ability of the innovator to manipulate signals.
If such manipulation is relatively easy, patents are necessary. If manipulation is costly, patents are
harmful.
We use our general mechanism design approach to analyze a variety of speciﬁcp r o p o s a l st o
replace patents by alternative mechanisms intended to spur innovation while avoiding the deadweight
costs of monopoly. Kremer (1998) has forcefully argued that a particular mechanism, patent buyouts,
can induce an eﬃcient level of innovation without the costs of monopoly. His mechanism utilizes an
auction to buy patents. Such an auction exploits information that competitors and, more generally,
the market have in determining the terms of the buyout.
We show that Kremer’s auction is susceptible to manipulation by the innovator. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that the innovator can use one or more accomplices to participate in the auction. We
show that Kremer’s auction leads to ineﬃcient outcomes. If the auction designer can exclude the
innovator or his accomplices from participating in the auction, the mechanism does indeed yield
eﬃcient outcomes. Thus, the desirability of Kremer’s mechanism relies on the ability to preclude
the manipulation of the mechanism by the innovator. Recently, the Advanced Market Commitments
(AMC) plan has been set up with the active participation of a number of governments and non-
governmental organizations. This plan proposes to subsidize, at deeply discounted prices, the vaccine
manufacturers who sell vaccines which protect against tropical diseases to developing countries. The
mechanism makes the amount of the subsidy a function of the number of doses of vaccine sold by
the pharmaceutical company. The mechanism is intended to allow vaccine manufacturers to recoup
the cost of innovation while ensuring that vaccines are sold at the marginal cost of production. Our
main result shows that this mechanism is vulnerable to hidden buybacks. Vaccine manufacturers
have strong incentives to buy, or have accomplices buy, dosages of the vaccine secretly. If such
buybacks are easy to implement, the mechanism used by the AMC plan is likely to yield highly
ineﬃcient outcomes. If hidden buybacks are privately costly, this mechanism is likely to do well in
3stimulating innovations while avoiding deadweight losses.
In terms of applications and designing mechanisms in practice, the main message of our
paper is that we should be cautious about adopting proposed new mechanisms. Such mechanisms
require consideration of how to make them manipulation proof. We have raised concerns about
manipulation of three speciﬁc kinds. For mechanisms that condition rewards on the quantity of
the units sold on the market, market manipulation can be conducted through buybacks as well as
attempts by innovators to set prices artiﬁcially low to stimulate demand. The second mechanism
is explicit or implicit bribes. The third type of market manipulation that is particularly relevant in
the context of auctions is the use of accomplices to submit fake bids.
There is a small literature on how information available on the market can be used in de-
signing rewards for innovation.3 Kremer (1998) is the most inﬂuential recent paper with a detailed
prize reward mechanism. As we have argued above, his mechanism is subject to the possibility of
manipulation. Guell and Fischbaum (1995) propose a mechanism which uses sales on a test market
for a relatively short period of time to obtain an estimate of the social surplus. Once such infor-
mation is received, the government extrapolates this information to obtain an estimate of the total
value of the social surplus if a good were to be sold on the total market. Then the innovator receives
a prize with the value equal to the estimated surplus. This proposal is certainly subject to market
manipulation. The innovator has strong incentives to increase the demand in the test market. In
the most plausible cases, if one assumes that the marginal cost of production is small compared
to the value of the innovation, and if one assumes that the monopolist can sell the good at zero
price, then this mechanism leads to extremely ineﬃcient outcomes. Shavell and van Ypersele (2001)
propose an optional reward system in which they allow an innovator to either stay with the patent
or choose a buyout reward. Their mechanism has rewards only if the lowest social payoﬀ is positive.
If such an assumption does not hold, patents are optimal.
2. Model
Consider an economy in which an innovator has an idea of quality .T h i s i d e a c a n b e
transformed into a good of quality  if a ﬁxed cost of 0 is incurred. If this cost is not incurred,




and is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function ().T h es o c i a lv a l u eo ft h e
innovation under competitive markets is given by (),w h e r e0 (·)  0,  (0) = 0.
3See Abramowicz (2003) for a review of a variety of proposals.
4We normalize proﬁts if a good is produced under the competitive markets to be equal to
zero. The good can also be produced by a monopoly. Let the monopoly proﬁts be given by (),
where 0(·)  0, (0) = 0. We assume that monopoly conveys deadweight costs. The social value
of the innovation under monopoly, (), is smaller than the social value of the innovation under
competitive markets:
() ≥ () ≥ 0
We assume 0 (·)  0, (0) = 0.
One simple setup which generates the payoﬀ functions  (·),  (·), (·) is the following.
Suppose that the inverse demand function for the single good produced in the marketplace is given
by  = (),w h e r e is a shift parameter that aﬀects the demand curve. Let  denote the
marginal cost of production. Here the social surplus is given by the area below the demand curve





The social surplus under monopoly is given by
()=
Z ∞
 [()+(  − )]
where  is the price chosen by a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. This simple example easily maps
onto the general environment described above and generates the surplus function under the compet-
itive markets  (), the surplus function under the monopoly  (), and the function for monopoly
proﬁts of the form  ().
3. Benchmark with full information
In this section, we set up a benchmark example of the environment in which the quality of
an idea is known to the planner.
The classic analysis of the optimal patent length problem is the work of Nordhaus (1969).
The planner seeks to maximize the discounted value of the social surplus. The only instrument
available to the planner is a patent if length ˆ . The problem of the planner is to determine the
length of time ˆ  that a patent will be valid, which solves the following problem:
max
ˆ 











−() ≥  (1)
In the objective function, the social surplus is equal to  () for the time period between 0 and ˆ 
as the good is produced by the monopoly under the patent granted. Afterward, the social surplus
is equal to  () as the good is produced under the competitive markets. The equation (1) is a








[ ()+( 1− ) ()] () (2)
s.t.
() ≥ 
Suppose now that prizes are available, and prizes can be a function of the quality of the good.
Then the problem of the social planner becomes that of maximizing (2) subject to
()+ () ≥ 
where  () represents the prize. Since a prize is a lump sum transfer ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes
on consumers, it does not aﬀect the social surplus. The solution of the problem with prizes is then
to set the patent length  =0and reward innovators with prizes above the critical threshold value
where the voluntary participation constraint binds. Thus, if the planner has as much information
as the innovator, patents are never optimal. This reasoning leads us to consider the environments
in which the planner has less information than private agents.
4. Benchmark with private information
Consider a benchmark model in which the quality of the idea  is private information to the
innovator. No other agents can observe . The planner only observes whether the good has been
produced or not. Since the innovator can always incur no cost and produce a good of type 0,t h e
instruments available to the planner are, without loss of generality, the length of the patent  and
the lump-sum prize or transfer .
We now deﬁne a mechanism design problem of the social planner as follows. From the










→ {01} is an instruction from the planner to the innovator recommending whether or




→ [01].T h e





These outcome functions induce the following payoﬀs for the innovator. Let  (ˆ ) denote
the proﬁts of the innovator who has an idea of quality , reports an idea of quality ˆ  to the planner,
where  =1denotes that type 0 good is produced, and  =0denotes that  =0good is
produced. The innovator’s payoﬀs are given by
 (ˆ )=(ˆ )
h
(ˆ )() −  + (ˆ )
i

The social surplus for the planner under truth telling is given by
 =
Z
{()[()()+( 1− ())() − ]} () (3)
The above equation states that for the period of length  () the good is produced under
monopoly so that the planner receives the surplus of (),f o rt h ep e r i o do f(1−()) the good is
produced by the competitive markets and the surplus of () is received.












In this formulation of the incentive compatibility constraint, note that we require that an
innovator who follows the recommendation of the planner, () and reports his true type gets a
higher payoﬀ than an innovator who deviates from the recommendation of the planner and chooses
 6= () or misreports the type ˆ ,o rd o e sb o t h .
A mechanism satisﬁes voluntary participation if
 (()) ≥ 0 (5)
7We say that the mechanism satisﬁes a no money pump assumption if
(0) = 0 (6)
This assumption is motivated by the following considerations. The economy has a large number of
innovators with ideas of value  =0 . If the mechanism gave positive prizes  to all innovators, the
society will then not be able to pay oﬀ for all of these ideas of no value.
We now formally deﬁne an interim-eﬃcient mechanism.
Definition 1. The mechanism is interim eﬃcient if it maximizes social surplus (3) subject to
incentive compatibility (4), no money pump assumption (6), and voluntary participation (5).
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (Optimality of uniform patents). The interim-eﬃcient mechanism has no
prizes  ()=0 , ∀, and a constant patent length  ()=¯ , ∀.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that there is some critical threshold ∗ such that ()=0for  ∗,a n d
()=1for  ≥ ∗. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that 1  2, (1)=1 ,a n d
(2)=0 . Consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the innovator who has an idea of
quality 2 and contemplates a deviation to reporting 1. Under the supposition that (2)=0  the
payoﬀ of the innovator of truth telling is equal to 0. Using the incentive compatibility constraint,
we then have the following sequence of inequalities leading to a contradiction:
0 ≥  (1)(2)+ (1) − (1)(1)+ (1) −  ≥ 0
Here, the ﬁrst inequality is the incentive compatibility constraint. The second inequality fol-
lows because () is strictly increasing. The last inequality follows from the voluntary participation
constraint of the type 1. This argument establishes the critical threshold result.
Next we show that the incentive compatibility constraint implies that for the set of the









to the incentive compatibility constraint (4), we have that for any , ˆ 




































Then, since social surplus is decreasing in the length of the patent, having a constant patent
length is optimal. Voluntary participation by the threshold type implies that
¯ (∗)+ (∗) −  ≥ 0
Welfare maximization implies that the threshold type must satisfy
¯  (∗)+( 1− ) (∗) −  ≥ 0
Because  (∗) ≥  (∗) ≥ (∗), it follows that welfare maximization implies that the voluntary
participation of the threshold type ∗ is binding and the prize for the threshold type  (∗)=0 .
Since the patent length is constant and  () is increasing, then the incentive compatibility constraint
implies that  ()=0 , ∀. 
Notice that the interim-eﬃcient mechanism yields the same allocations as the mechanism in
Nordhaus (1969) described above. Here, however, we allow for the possibility of prizes in addition
to patents. Incentive compatibility and welfare maximization imply that it is optimal not to use
prizes or taxes but to use patents only. Hence, the result that only patents are used does not follow
by assumption but rather by the need to provide incentives for innovation.
We now formally deﬁne a full information eﬃcient mechanism.
Definition 2. Am e c h a n i s mi s ex post eﬃcient (or full information eﬃcient) if it maximizes
the social surplus (3) subject to no money pump assumption (6) and the voluntary participation
constraint (5).
It is immediate that the ex post eﬃcient mechanism has no deadweight loss. Speciﬁcally, the
ex post eﬃcient mechanism has the planner recommending the innovator to innovate if  () ≥ .
Note that the ex post eﬃcient mechanism can be implemented by a variety of prizes. Speciﬁcally,
any prize that satisﬁes  ≤  () if ()=1implements the ex post eﬃcient outcomes.
95. Market signals, prizes, and patents
Consider a version of the economy in which private agents other than the innovator receive
signals about the quality of the good innovated. One can imagine a variety of schemes that elicit the
information that other agents – or more generally, the markets – possess. Two speciﬁc schemes
gained signiﬁcant recent attention both theoretically and in policymaking circles.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that in addition to the innovator, another private agent, called a com-
petitor, observes the value of the innovated good  after it was innovated. In this environment, the
planner can allow the length of the patent, and the prize/transfers depend on information revealed
by the competitor about the quality of the good. Note that the decision on whether to incur the
cost of innovation  cannot depend on the information available to the competitor.
A. Market signals without manipulation
Let  denote the report made by the innovator and () the recommendation by the mech-
anism to incur the ﬁxed cost  (Recall that if the cost is not incurred, the innovator produces a
good of quality 0) After the innovator produces the good, the competitor must submit a report of
the quality of the good. Let  denote the report made by the competitor. A mechanism consists
of reports made by the innovator and the competitor and outcome functions (), (), (),
(),w h e r e() denotes the recommendation by the mechanism to incur the cost ; ()
denotes the length of the patent; () denotes the prize to the innovator; and () denotes
transfer to the competitor.
The payoﬀs to the innovator induced by the mechanism are then given by
 (ˆ  ())=(ˆ )
h
(ˆ  ())() −  + (ˆ )
i
 (7)
In this formulation of the payoﬀ to the innovator,  (ˆ  ()), the arguments are, in
order, the true type of the quality of the good , the report by the innovator ˆ , the report by the
competitor  (), and the decision of the innovator  to incur the cost . Note that the report of
the competitor  () depends on whether or not the innovator incurs the cost . The payoﬀst o
the competitor are given by  ().
The incentive compatibility constraint for the innovator is given by







10Note that in this incentive compatibility constraint we have assumed that the competitor
reveals the information truthfully. This formulation of the incentive compatibility constraint fol-
lows from the revelation principle that states that the Bayesian equilibrium of any game can be
implemented as a truth-telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the competitor is given by
() ≥ (ˆ 

)
An interim-eﬃcient and the ex post eﬃcient mechanisms are deﬁned in the analogous way as
i nt h ea b o v e .N o t et h a ts i n c ee xp o s te ﬃciency assumes that the planner has the same information
as the private agents, the ex post eﬃcient outcomes in the environment with and without market
signals are identical.
In the following proposition, we show that the patents are never optimal. In fact, the full
information optimum can be achieved solely with prizes.
Proposition 2. (Optimality of prizes) In the environment with market signals, the interim-
eﬃcient mechanism is ex post eﬃcient.
Proof. Let the planner’s recommendation be to produce the good when the social value is higher
than ﬁxed costs: ()=1if  () ≥ ; ()=0otherwise. Let 1 () ≥  if ()=1 ;
1 ()=0if  6= .L e t2 ()=0 . In other words, implement the full information outcomes
associated with the value of  only if both agents report that same value of . If the agents disagree,
then give the innovator a transfer equal to zero. The competitor always receives the same transfer
regardless of his report. Then the best response of the competitor is to report the value of the
innovated goods truthfully. 
Note that above we restricted the planner to award the patent only to the innovator. A more
general setup would allow the planner to reward the competitor with the patent. This restriction
is without loss of generality, since proposition (2.) shows that the planner can achieve the full
information outcome.
So far, we have assumed that the competitor receives the same signal as the innovator.
Suppose now that the competitor receives a noisy, but unbiased, signal  of the quality of the
good so that (|)= and that (|)= Consider a mechanism which sets the prize to the
innovator 1()= if () ≥  and 0 otherwise and sets the transfer to the competitor to 0
11Since the innovator is risk-neutral, this mechanism yields the ex post eﬃcient level of innovation as
a truth-telling outcome.
The competitor’s report also has an immediate market interpretation. Consider the simple
market setup described above in which the inverse demand for the good is given by  = () and
 is the marginal cost of production. Suppose the market consists of a large number of producers, all
of whom can produce the good at marginal cost. The mechanism designer then makes the knowledge
of how to produce the good freely available to all producers and asks each producer to report sales
of the good. Since the price  equals the marginal cost of production  in a competitive market,
aggregate sales  can then be used to uncover the market size parameter 
Note that we have also assumed that the cost of innovating is known to the designer. Our
results extend readily to the cse in which this cost is drawn from some distribution, say, () and
is private information to the innovator. To see this extension, consider a mechanism in which the
innovator’s prize is given by the social surplus if the innovator’s and competitor’s reports agree, so
that 1()=() and the innovator receives no prize if the reports disagree so that 1()=0
if  6=  Clearly, truth telling is incentive compatible and the mechanism implements the eﬃcient
allocation in the sense that ()=1if and only if () ≥ 
B. Unique implementation of prize mechanisms
The mechanism that we have discussed uses information from the competitor to reward the
innovator. Under our particular mechanism, the competitor is indiﬀerent about what information
to report. Truth telling is one of the equilibria of the game. Typically, the game has many other
equilibria. A natural question is whether we can design a mechanism which is ex post eﬃcient
and has a unique equilibrium. Here, we adapt the mechanism of Moore and Repullo (1988) to our
environment. We show that such a mechanism has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which
both the innovator and the competitor report the truth.
The mechanism has two stages. In Stage 1, the innovator and the competitor make reports
to the planner. Denote the report of the innovator by 1 and that of the competitor by .I f
1 = ,e q u a l ss a y, then implement the ex post eﬃcient outcome associated with the common
report .I f1 6= , then move to Stage 2. In Stage 2, the innovator is given a choice between two
alternatives, denoted by A and B. In each alternative, the innovator is granted a patent with the
12length  (1) and  (1) and prizes  (1 ) and  (1) chosen to satisfy
max{ (1 ) (1) −  +  (1); (1)} (9)
 max{ (1)(1) −  +  (1 ); (1)}
and
max{ (1) () −  +  (1); (1 )} (10)
 max{ (1)(1) −  +  (1); (1)}
 () − max{ (1)() −  +  (1 ); (1)} (11)
The basic idea behind this mechanism is that in the second stage, the innovator is given an
option to rescind on his previous report at a cost. The ﬁrst inequality ensures that if 1 is the true
report and  is not, the innovator will choose alternative . The second inequality ensures that
if  is the true report and 1 is not, the innovator will choose alternative . The third inequality
ensures that if the competitor tells the truth, the innovator also tells the truth and ﬁnds it optimal
not to go to Stage 2. Since four choice variables need to satisfy only three inequalities, clearly we
can choose these four variables.
Now we turn to the transfers to the competitor. If both agents report the same value of  in
Stage 1, the competitor receives a transfer of zero. If the reports diﬀer, then the competitor pays a
tax − if the innovator chooses an alternative  and receives a transfer ¯  if the innovator chooses
an alternative .
We claim that this mechanism has a unique equilibrium that is truth telling. Suppose that
the equilibrium for some realized value of  involves these two agents reporting a common value of
ˆ  6= . Under this supposed equilibrium, the payoﬀ of the competitor is equal to zero. Now consider
a deviation by the competitor to the true report, that is setting  = . Under this deviation,
the mechanism requires the players to proceed to Stage 2. Inequality (10) guarantees that in this
subgame, the innovator will optimally choose the alternative . Recall that if the innovator chooses
the alternative , the competitor receives a positive transfer. Thus, such deviation is proﬁtable and
the equilibrium cannot have both agents reporting a common value ˆ  6= .
Now suppose that the innovator reports the truth and the competitor lies and reports a value
of ˆ  6= . The mechanism requires that the players move to Stage 2. In that stage, inequality (9)
13guarantees that in Stage 2, the innovator will choose option . The competitor’s payoﬀ is then given
by the tax that the competitor must pay. A deviation of the competitor to reporting the truth gives
the competitor a zero payoﬀ which dominates misreporting. Thus, we cannot have an equilibrium
in which the innovator tells the truth and the competitor lies.
Next suppose that the competitor reports the truth and the innovator lies and reports a value
of ˆ  6= . The mechanism requires that the players move to Stage 2. In that stage, inequality (10)
guarantees that the innovator will choose option .T h e i n n o v a t o r ’ s p a y o ﬀ is then given by the
left-hand side of (10) equal to the right-hand side of (11). Consider a deviation from the supposed
equilibrium in which the innovator reports the truth. The payoﬀ to this deviation is given by the
left-hand side of (11). Thus, this deviation is proﬁtable and the game cannot have an equilibrium
in which the competitor reports the truth and the innovator lies.
This argument establishes the following proposition on a unique implementation of the ex
post eﬃcient equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Consider the game in which the innovator and the competitor both receive the
same signal about the quality of the good to be innovated. There exists a mechanism which has truth
telling by both agents and which implements the ex post eﬃcient outcome.
6. Market signals with bribes
We now consider an environment in which the innovator can bribe the competitor to misreport
the quality of the good. We show that in this environment, the equilibrium outcomes coincide exactly
with those in the environment in which no agent other than the innovator observes the quality of
the good. This result implies that patents are again optimal as in Proposition 1..
We begin by describing how the possibility of bribes modiﬁes the constraints that the social
planner faces. We do so by considering an arbitrary mechanism which consists of action sets 
for the innovator and  for the competitor, actions  ∈  and  ∈ , recommendations by the
planner to innovate (1), length of patent granted to the innovator  (),l e n g t ho ft h ep a t e n t
awarded to the competitor  (), and the prizes  () and  ().
We assume that the players can observe each other’s actions. We also assume that they can
agree, before the actions are chosen, to pay transfers (bribes) to each other contingent on the actions
chosen by the innovator and the competitor. We assume that these bribes are not observable to
the mechanism designer and that there are no limits to the size of the bribes. Let  () and
14() denote the payments made by the innovator and the competitor so that
 ()+ ()=0  (12)
Note that we assume that these bribes can be enforced. The payoﬀs of the agents are
augmented with the bribes. The revelation principle clearly holds in this environment so that any

















denote the payoﬀs granted by the direct mechanism to the
innovator and the competitor. These payoﬀs are given by
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 (13)
and the payoﬀs to the competitor are given by









Note that these payoﬀs do not include the bribes. When augmented by the bribes, the payoﬀsa r e









Here,  denotes the quality of the idea, ˆ  denotes the report by the innovator, and ˆ 

denotes the
report by the competitor. We now prove the lemma as follows.
Lemma 1. The truth-telling equilibrium of any direct mechanism must satisfy the bribe-proofness
condition:

















Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose for some , ˆ ,a n dˆ 

 truth telling is an equilibrium
and the bribe-proofness condition (15) is not satisﬁed. Suppose that, at the report ˆ ˆ 

 the innovator








(()) and the competitor








 (()) Consider a bribe by the innovator









− (()) S i n c e ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,( 1 5 )d o e sn o th o l d ,t h i sb r i b em a k e st h e
competitor’s payoﬀs higher than under truth telling, so that truth telling is not an equilibrium. We
have a contradiction. 
15Note that this lemma relies upon the assumption that the bribe payments are not observable
to the mechanism designer. Note also that the proof of this lemma fails if the size of bribes is
limited. To see that the lemma does not hold if bribes are limited, note that if we restrict bribes to
be zero, this environment reduces to the one without market manipulation. In that environment,
the eﬃcient outcome violates (15).
We use this lemma to show that the solution to the social planner’s problem in this environ-
ment with bribes coincides with the solution to that in the environment without market signals.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the innovator is given by







and the incentive compatibility constraint for the competitor is given by





We denote the sum of the payoﬀs to the innovator and the competitor by the social planner:
¯  ()= (()) +   (())
The bribe-proofness constraint is now given by



















The social planner’s payoﬀs in the truth-telling equilibrium are now given by
 =
Z
{()[¯  ()()+( 1− ¯  ())() − ]} () (18)
where
¯  ()= ()+ ().
The social planner’s problem is to maximize (18) subject to (16), (17), (15), and the analogs
of the voluntary participation and no money pump constraints. We now show the proposition that
characterizes the social planner’s problem.
Proposition 4. (Optimality of patents with bribes) The solution to the social planner’s prob-
16lem with bribes coincides with that in the environment with no market signals problem. In particular,
the solution to the social planner’s problem necessarily has  ()  0 if ()=1 .
Proof. Consider a relaxed version of the social planner’s problem which does not impose the
individual incentive compatibility constraints and which replaces the voluntary participation and
the no money pump assumption by two constraints – one that requires that the sum of the payoﬀs
to the innovator and the competitor is non-negative, and the other that the sum of transfers to
them is non-positive. This formulation of the problem is identical to the social planner’s problem
in the environment with no market signals. To see that the formulations are identical, note that,
using (13) and (14), (15) can now be written as








()) + (ˆ ˆ 

()))() −  + (ˆ )+(ˆ )
ii

This incentive constraint is clearly eﬀectively the same as (8). Thus, any solution to the social
planner’s problem in the environment with bribes can yield surplus no greater than in the relaxed
problem. Consider the following mechanism which is clearly feasible in the social planner’s problem.
In this mechanism, the competitor’s reports are ignored and the competitor receives zero trans-
fers. Thus, the solutions to the two problems coincide. The last part of the proposition follows
immediately from Proposition (1.). 
A. Implicit collusion as a form of bribes
One interpretation of bribes is that they are implicit payments sustained by a form of implicit
collusion. An example of such implicit collusion is as follows. Suppose that the economy has two
a g e n t sa n dl a s t sf o ra ni n ﬁnite number of periods. Agents discount the future at the rate .W i t h
probability 0.5, one of these agents is the innovator and the other is the competitor in each period.
Suppose that the planner chooses some mechanism. Fix an equilibrium of this inﬁnitely repeated
mechanism. The bribe paid by the innovator to the competitor can now be thought as the diﬀerence
between the payoﬀs in this equilibrium and the best equilibrium. Suppose that the payoﬀsi na n y
equilibrium are bounded above and that the diﬀerences in the payoﬀsi nt h eb e s ta n dt h ew o r s t
equilibria are given by ¯ . We argue that the planner can always choose a mechanism which induces
truth telling. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the planner chooses in each period a mechanism similar to
the Moore and Repullo (1998) mechanism described above. Let the planner set the Stage 2 transfers
to the competitor at ¯ ¯ . By the same argument as in the section on the unique implementation
17in the single period game, it follows that the competitor always tells the truth regardless of the
innovator’s strategies. Thus, manipulation in the form of implicit collusion alone does not suggest
that patents are optimal.
7. Limitations of Kremer’s mechanism when manipulation is possible
Kremer (1998) describes a mechanism intended to exploit information that other market
participants may have regarding the value of the innovation. Kremer’s mechanism is as follows. A
patent holder has an option of choosing to be a part of the auction mechanism. The government
chooses a second price auction. The winner of the second price auction receives a patent with
probability  and in that event pays the second-highest bid. With probability (1 − ),t h ep a t e n t
is invalid, and the information associated with the patent is placed in the public domain. In either
event, the innovator receives a prize which is a multiple (a markup) of the second-highest bid.
Suppose that the value of  is observed by the innovator and all market participants. Without
market manipulation, Kremer’s mechanism leads to better outcomes than under the patent system
with probability (1 − ) and to no worse outcomes with probability , if the prize multiple is suﬃ-
ciently high. The usual argument for this result is that in the second price auction, the dominant
strategy equilibrium is for all bidders to bid the true value of the object. Thus, all bidders bid
 (),w h e r e is the length of the patent and () denotes monopoly proﬁt s .A sl o n ga st h e
prize markup is greater than 1, the patent holder ﬁnds it optimal to accept the auction mecha-
nism. Indeed, this mechanism can lead some innovators to choose to innovate under the auction
mechanism when they have not chosen under the patent system. It is, however, possible to set the
markup so as to induce the eﬃcient level of innovation. Note that for this mechanism to yield good
outcomes, it is important that 0,b e c a u s ei f =0 , the market participants have no incentive
to submit any bids. Equilibria in which the participants submit no bids are possible and likely to
occur, especially if bidding is costly.
Next consider a possibility of market manipulation. Formally, we assume that the innovator
can participate directly in Kremer’s auction or can designate an agent whom we call an accomplice
to bid on his behalf. Now suppose that each other market participant  receives a signal  from a
distribution (|). These signals are independent across market participants conditional on the
innovator’s type . Without loss of generality, suppose that  (|)=.
We will show that in any equilibrium of this game, the innovator (or his accomplice) wins
the auction and that the second-highest bid is zero. To see that this outcome is an equilibrium,
18suppose that one of the market participants wins the auction. In order for this outcome to be
an equilibrium, the market participant must submit a bid higher than the innovator’s bid. If
the market participant’s bid is higher than the true value of the innovation, then that market
participant is better oﬀ bidding zero. If the other participant’s bid is below the patent’s value to the
innovator, the innovator should raise his bid to the true value. Furthermore, note that if  is strictly
positive, conditional on innovating, the innovator should participate in the auction so as to retain
the patent in the event that the auction mechanism is not used to give the patent away. That is, the
innovator cannot credibly commit not to participate in the auction. Realizing that this will be the
equilibrium outcome if the innovator submits the patent for the auction, the equilibrium strategy for
the innovator is not to submit the patent to the auction mechanism. Then, the auction mechanism
will not help in reducing deadweight losses due to the patent system. Other forms of manipulation
lead to diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes but share the property that the auction mechanism will
not help solve the problem of reducing the deadweight losses. To see the eﬀects of other forms of
manipulation, suppose that the innovator can designate two accomplices to the auction mechanism.
Then the equilibrium outcome in the auction mechanism is for each accomplice to bid the maximal
amount permitted by the auction mechanism. The other market participants then bid zero. These
strategies are clearly best responses. Yet, the mechanism leads to too much innovation compared
to the optimum.
8. Market signals with costly manipulation
We have shown that if the innovator can manipulate market signals by bribing other partici-
pants, patents are optimal. We now examine economies in which the innovator can manipulate the
market signals in other ways. We show that if manipulation is costless, then patents are optimal.
If manipulation is very costly, prizes are optimal. For intermediate ranges, a combination of prizes
and patents is optimal.
We begin by describing a fairly abstract environment in which the planner receives the signal
 about the quality of the good innovated. The innovator can manipulate the signal by incurring
the cost. Speciﬁcally, if the planner receives the signal , the cost to the innovator of manipulating
the signal is given by ( − ). Note that if the innovator does not manipulate the signal, then
 = , so the signal reveals the quality of the good perfectly. With this formulation, the payoﬀso f
19an innovator who has an idea of quality  and chooses to report the idea of quality ˆ  are given by
 (ˆ )=(ˆ )
h
(ˆ )() −  + (ˆ ) − 
³
 − ˆ 
´i
 (19)
Incentive compatibility now becomes







The social planner’s payoﬀ, voluntary participation, and the no money pump constraints are
unchanged. The social planner now maximizes the social surplus subject to the incentive compati-
bility constraint (20), voluntary participation (5), and the no money pump constraints (6).
Let  (∗)= denote the threshold value of the quality of the good such that if  ≥ ∗
the full information eﬃcient mechanism requires that the good be innovated, ()=1 .I f ≤ ∗,
then the good is not innovated, ()=0 . We then have the following proposition. We show that if
the manipulation costs are suﬃciently high, patents are not optimal. If the manipulation costs are
suﬃciently low, the patents are used in any eﬃcient mechanism.
Proposition 5. If  ≥ 
∗, then the solution to the social planner’s problem can be implemented
with prizes alone. If 
∗, then the solution to the social planner’s problem necessarily requires
using patents.
Proof. First, suppose that  ≥ 
∗. Consider the following mechanism that sets  ()= if  ≥ ∗;
 ()=0 ,o t h e r w i s e ;()=1if and only if  ≥ ∗. We will show that this mechanism is incentive
compatible. Consider a reporting problem of an innovator with the quality of idea  ∗.T r u t h
telling yields a payoﬀ of zero for this innovator. Suppose that this innovator deviates, claims that
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 0
Thus, this deviation is not incentive compatible.
Suppose next that the innovator deviates and claims that the quality of the idea ˆ  ≥ ∗ and
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ˆ  − 0
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≤  − ∗ ≤ 0
20Thus, this deviation is not incentive compatible either.
Next suppose that 
∗. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the welfare-
maximizing mechanism does not require patents and speciﬁes some prize function  ().S u c h a
mechanism will clearly not have an innovation for  ∗. Since a mechanism which only uses
patents is feasible and has innovation for some values of , the welfare-maximizing mechanism also
has an innovation for some value of . Suppose that for some value of  ≥ ∗, the mechanism
speciﬁes ()=1and some prize  () Voluntary participation implies that
 () ≥ 
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the innovator who has an idea of quality 0 and
contemplates deviation to this value of . Incentive compatibility requires
0 ≥  () − ( − 0) ≥  −  ≥  − ∗
Since  − ∗  0, we have a contradiction. This mechanism is not incentive compatible. 
A. A simple example
We now consider a simple example which demonstrates that as the cost of manipulating the
signal rises, the length of the patent falls. To do so, we suppose that the quality of the ideas takes
three values: 0  1  2. Suppose that the  (1) and  (2)  ,  (2)   (2)  ,
and that 
2. From Proposition 5. we know that the mechanism must feature patents. Since
 (1)  , it is optimal to have no innovation if the quality of the idea is 1. Therefore, the
incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that the innovator of quality 1 does not misreport
the quality of the idea and manipulate the signal is given by
0 ≥  (2)(1) −  +  (2) − (2 − 1) (21)
The incentive compatibility constraint that the innovator of type  =0does not misreport
the quality of the idea and manipulate the signal is given by
0 ≥  (2) − (2 − 0) (22)
21Note that this incentive compatibility constraint is also the incentive compatibility constraint
for the innovator with the idea 1 who chooses not to incur the cost and to misreport the signal.
The voluntary participation constraint for type 2 is given by
 (2)(2)+ (2) ≥  (23)
The no money pump assumption and the voluntary participation constraints for type 0 and
type 1 imply that
 (0) =  (1)=0  (24)
The social surplus is given by
 (2)(2)+( 1− ) (2) − 
Clearly, social surplus is maximized by making  (2) as small as possible subject to the
incentive compatibility and the voluntary participation constraints. Since reducing  (2) relaxes
(21), it follows that the voluntary participation constraint (23) must be binding so that
 (2)(2)+ (2)= (25)
Substituting for  (2) from (25) into (21), we have
0 ≥  (2)(1) −  (2)(2) − (2 − 1)
Since the right side of this inequality is strictly negative, it follows that (21) is not binding at the






We have shown that the length of the patent  (2) is strictly decreasing in the manipulation
cost .
229. Conclusion
Our paper provides a comprehensive mechanism design treatment of providing incentives for
innovation. We explored how information available to the competitors of the innovator and market
information can be used by the mechanism designer to create such incentives. Our focus is also on
the various ways in which information may be manipulated and on designing optimal mechanisms
which are robust to such manipulation.
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